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Single-Purpose Agricultural and 
Horticultural Structures:
What’s Included?
-by Neil E. Harl*  
	 The	Tax	Reform	Act	 of	 1986,	 in	 enacting	MACRS	 (the	Modified	Accelerated	Cost	
Recovery System)1	created	a	classification	for	property	with	an	A.D.R.	midpoint	life	of	
16 years or more and less than 20 years as “ten-year property.” The 10-year property 
classification	includes	–	(1)	any	single	purpose	agricultural	or	horticultural	structure	(within	
the	meaning	of	I.R.C.	§	168(i)(13);	(2)	any	tree	or	vine	bearing	fruit	or	nuts;	(3)any	qualified	
smart electric meter; and (4) any smart  electric grid system.2 
	 The	question	that	keeps	coming	up	is.	.	.	.what	property	is	eligible	for	the	“single	purpose	
agricultural or horticultural structure” tax  treatment? 
What is the meaning of “single purpose agricultural or horticultural structure”?
	 The	term	“10-year	property”	includes,	according	to	the	statute	providing	a	definition,3 
the	following	definition	of	“single	purpose	livestock	structure”		--	“.	.	.	any	enclosure	or	
structure	specifically	designed,	constructed,	and	used	–	(I)	for	housing,	raising	and	feeding	a	
particular type of livestock and their produce; and (II) for housing the equipment (including 
any replacements) for the housing, raising and feeding referred to in clause I.” The  same 
subsection states that the term “livestock” includes poultry.”4	Beyond	that,	the	definitional	
statute	states	that	“an	enclosure	or	structure	which	provides	work	space	shall	be	treated	
as	a	single	purpose	agricultural	or	horticultural	structure	only	if	such	work	space	is	solely	
for	–	(I)	the	stocking,	caring	for	or	collecting	of	livestock	or	plants	(as	the	case	may	be)	or	
their produce, (II) the maintenance of the enclosure or structure, and (III) the maintenance 
or replacement  of the equipment or stock enclosed or housed therein.”5 Thus, any space 
devoted	 to	 other	 uses	 (such	 as	 an	office	 for	managing	 a	 farming	operation)	would	be	
ineligible to be treated as a “single purpose agricultural structure.”
Definition of “livestock”
	 To	be	eligible	to	be	classified	as	“10-year”	property,	the	key	issue	is	whether	particular	
animals are considered as “livestock.” The Code section in question (I.R.C. § 168(e), (i)) 
does	not	define	“livestock.”	However,	the	term	livestock	is	defined	elsewhere	in	the	Internal	
Revenue Code and regulations in a similar but not identical setting. The unusual income 
tax treatment of gains and losses for property “used in the trade or business” is perhaps 
the	most		widely		quoted	definition		of	“livestock.”6   That  subsection,  I.R.C. § 1231(b) 
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§	1231(b)(3)	treatment	in	figuring	gains	and	losses	and	should	
also be considered eligible for occupancy of a “single purpose 
agricultural structure”12 based on presently available authorities. 
It should be noted that § 168(e), (i) authorizing “single purpose 
agricultural structures” as 10-year property does not explicitly 
require	“trade	or	business”	status	but	because	it	is	well	known	
that	dogs	and	cats,	for	example,	are	also	owned	and	held	as	pets,	
that	would	make	them	ineligible	in	that	capacity	for	§	1231(b)	
status.13
ENDNOTES
 1  Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 1986), amending I.R.C. 
§	168(e)(1)	(classification	rule;	168(b)(1)	(depreciation	rate).
 2  I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(D).
 3  I.R.C. § 168(i)(13).
 4  I.R.C. § 168(i)(13)(B)(iv).
 5  I.R.C. § 168(i)(13)(B)(iii).
 6  I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3).
 7  I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), (B).
 8  The	statute	excludes	“poultry”	from	the	definition	of	livestock	
and is perhaps responsible for the bar in the regulations for 
‘poultry, chickens, turkeys, pigeons [and] geese.’
 9  Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3).
 10  Rodgers Dairy Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 66 (1950).
 11  Slawek	v.	Comm’r,	T.C.	Memo.	1987-438.
 12  I.R.C. §§ 168(e), (i), 168(e)(3)(D).
 13  Some states for state tax purposes, for example, do not include 
dogs, cats and birds kept as pets for pleasure or recreation as 
livestock. See Colorado Sales Tax Guide, Reg. 39-266-716.4. 
Compare	Ohio	Bull.	No.	15	which	specifies	that	dogs	are	included	
in	livestock.	Keep	in	mind	that	the	issue	in	this	article	is	one	of	
federal	tax	law,	not	state	tax	law.	
1(b),	 defines	 “livestock”	 to	 include	 “.	 .	 	 .	 	 cattle	 and	horses,	
regardless of age, held by the taxpayer for draft, breeding, dairy, 
or sporting purposes, and held . . . for 24 months or more from 
the date of acquisition, and . . . other livestock, regardless of 
age, held by the taxpayer for draft, breeding, dairy, or sporting 
purposes, . . . and held for 12 months or more from the date of 
acquisition. Such term does not include poultry.”7 The regulations 
promulgated	under	I.R.C.	§	1231(b)(3)	go	a	step	further	–
	 “In	the	case	of	cattle,	horses	or	other	livestock	–(3)	”.	.	.	
the	term	‘livestock’	is	given	a	broad,	rather	than	a	narrow	
interpretation and includes cattle, hogs, horses, mules, 
donkeys, sheep, goats, fur-bearing animals and other 
mammals.	However,	it	does	not	include	poultry,	chickens,	
turkeys, pigeons, geese,8	other	birds,	fish,	frogs,	reptiles,	
etc.”9
That passage in the regulations is important by emphasizing that 
the term “livestock” is to be given “. . . a broad, rather than a 
narrow	interpretation”	and	by	stating	that	“other	mammals”	are	
eligible to be considered livestock. 
 In support of the argument that the positions taken in the 
regulations under I.R,C. § 1231(b) should be extended to other 
animals used in a trade or business, the Tax Court has held that 
dogs produced or held for a trade or business purpose and used 
for advertising purposes are depreciable and the costs associated 
therewith	are	deductible.10	Likewise,	in	a	more	recent	Tax	Court	
decision,	a	guard	dog	was	deemed	a	capital	asset	with	a	10-
year	useful	life	and	was	eligible	for	investment	tax	credit	and	
depreciation.11	In	both	cases,	the	dogs	were	considered	to	have	
been used in a trade or business.
In conclusion
 It appears that any animal that is a member of the mammalian 
order and is used in a trade or business should be eligible for 
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CASES,	REGULATIONS	AND	STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
BANkruPTCy
CHAPTEr 12
 DISMISSAL.	The	debtors,	husband	and	wife,	filed	for	Chapter	
12	in	April	2013.	The	debtors	obtained	a	confirmed	plan	which	
contained	the	following	provision:	“If	the	Debtors	default	in	the	
terms	of	this	Stipulation,	which	default	continues	for	21	days	after	
notice	of	same,	then,	upon	the	filing	with	the	Court	of	an	affidavit	
of default by . . .[the secured creditor], it shall be automatically 
entitled	to	an	order	lifting	the	automatic	stay,	without	the	necessity	
of any hearing.” The debtors defaulted on their plan payments to 
two	secured	creditors	and	 the	creditors	filed	a	notice	of	default	
with	the	court	after	several	weeks.	Prior	to	the	secured	creditors’	
filing	of	default	notices	with	the	court,	the	debtors	filed	a	voluntary	
dismissal	of	the	case.	A	hearing	on	the	voluntary	dismissal	was	held	
at the same time that the Bankruptcy court ruled on the notices of 
default. The court granted the dismissal and entered an order lifting 
the	bankruptcy	stay.		The	debtors	refiled	for	Chapter	12	one	month	
later and the creditors objected that, under Section 109(g)(2), the 
debtors	were	 no	 longer	 eligible	 for	Chapter	 12.	Section	 109(g)	
prohibits	a	debtor	from	filing	a	Chapter	12	case	within	180	days	
after a prior case if the debtor requested and obtained a voluntary 
dismissal	 of	 the	 case	 following	 the	filing	of	 a	 request	 for	 relief	
from the automatic stay. The creditors argued that the stipulation 
in	the	confirmed	plan	operated	as	the	“request	for	relief	from	the	
automatic stay.” The debtors argued that the stipulation in the plan 
required	the	creditors	to	file	a	notice	of	default	as	the	“request	for	
relief from the automatic stay.” The court noted that a request for 
relief	from	the	automatic	stay	required	a	filing	of	a	motion	and	that	
the stipulation did not provide for the granting of the relief from the 
automatic	stay	but	provided	only	for	the	filing	of	notice	of	default	
as a means to obtain relief from the automatic stay. Because the 
debtors	filed	their	dismissal	motion	prior	to	the	filings	of	the	notices	
of default, the court held that Section 109(g) did not prevent the 
debtors	from	refiling	their	case	within	180	days	after	the	voluntary	
dismissal. In re Herremans, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2201 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 2015).
FEDErAL TAX
 SALE OF CHAPTEr 12 PrOPErTy. The debtors, husband 
and	wife,	filed	for	Chapter	12	and	obtained	a	confirmed	plan.	The	
